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Toward a Role for Protest in 
Environmental Law 
Emily Hammond† 
Abstract 
The story of environmental law closely coincides with that of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which has doubtless made 
many contributions to improved governance and enhanced environ–
mental protection. In this symposium tribute to the EPA’s fiftieth 
anniversary, however, I invite a renewed look at the role of protest in 
environmental law—both as an integral part of the development of 
environmental law and as an enduring critique of it. This approach 
demands of traditional legal scholarship that it interrogate its 
discomfort with direct-action methods; in the environmental law arena, 
it asks for both a deeper theoretization of protest and a renewed 
commitment to principles of environmental justice. Using examples 
from the environmental protest traditions of central Appalachia, I 
explore how those traditions have shaped environmental law and how 
the promise of environmental law has fallen short. These examples also 
make plain that the narrative of civil disobedience as “outside” of the 
legal system in contrast to participatory activities “within” the system 
is a false dichotomy. Indeed, the coordinated efforts among civil 
disobedients, local environmental movements, and impact litigators 
suggests the further need to theorize and operationalize a role for 
protest in environmental law. Ultimately, this Article calls for such a 
research agenda. 
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Introduction 
On the occasion of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
golden anniversary, observers of both administrative and environmental 
law do well to consider the EPA’s contributions to improved govern–
ance and enhanced environmental protection.1 For example, in many 
ways the EPA has been a pioneer in regulatory innovations that 
incorporate public participation, both formally2 and informally.3 Still, 
the limitations of regularized means of public participation are widely 
recognized.4 In this symposium contribution,5 I offer some preliminary 
thoughts on civil disobedience, protest, direct action, and other forms 
of resistance as part of the fabric of environmental law. 
This Article neared completion just prior to the declaration of the 
global COVID-19 pandemic, and as it goes to press, a nationwide 
antiracism protest movement has sounded alarms over the killing of 
Black people by police and our collective failure to reckon with deeply 
entrenched racism. The federal government, as well as some state and 
 
1. E.g., Wendy Wagner, It Isn’t Easy Being a Bureaucratic Expert: 
Celebrating the EPA’s Innovations, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1093 
(2020).  
2. The word “formally” here refers to agency actions taken according to 
predefined procedural requirements, not necessarily the narrow sense of 
the word used for agency actions governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (2012). See LeRoy Paddock, 
Environmental Accountability and Public Involvement, 21 Pace Envtl. 
L. Rev. 243 (2004) (cataloging and noting limits of formal means of 
participation in environmental decision-making); Jonathan Poisner, A 
Civil Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act’s 
Process for Citizen Participation, 96 Envtl. L. 53, 53 (1996) (“Virtually 
every federal environmental law passed in the 1970s contains significant 
provisions for citizen participation in the decision making of implementing 
agencies.”). Under President Obama’s leadership, the EPA also invigorated 
its commitment to environmental justice. See EPA, Plan EJ 2014 
Progress Report 1 (2014) (setting forth “EPA’s roadmap for integrating 
environmental justice (EJ) into its programs, policies and activities.”). 
3. E.g., Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for 
Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 313, 340 (2013) (reporting on generally favorable results 
of study considering the EPA’s treatment of petitions to revoke state 
authority). 
4. Paddock, supra note 2, at 243–44. The environmental-justice critique is 
particularly forceful, and not limited to public participation. E.g., Eileen 
Guana, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the 
Paradigm Paradox, 17 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3 (1998) (explaining how 
environmental-justice considerations fit poorly into expertise, pluralistic, 
and civic republican models of agency decision-making). 
5. Case Western Reserve University School of Law held the symposium The 
Environmental Protection Agency Turns 50 on October 18, 2019.  
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local governments, have met peaceful protestors with violence.6 And 
although some jurisdictions have taken steps to address at least a few 
of the deep racial inequities embedded in law and policy,7 there is 
significant long-term work to be done on both individual and societal 
bases.8 This Article’s focus on environmental protest may seem out-of-
step with the urgency of the current context.9 But the environmental 
justice critique of environmental law helps illuminate the deep-seated 
institutional deficiencies with which environmental protest reckons.  
Salient examples of environmental protest abound. Consider the 
Native Americans who have among other things blocked the paths of 
the Dakota Access Pipeline and Keystone XL Pipeline in protest of the 
 
6.  See, e.g., Philip Bump, Timeline: the Clearing of Lafayette Square, 
Washington Post (June 5, 2020, 9:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost 
 .com/politics/2020/06/02/timeline-clearing-lafayette-square/ [http:// 
 perma.cc/7437-9KHZ] (“Officers from several agencies closed in on protesters, 
using smoke canisters, irritants, explosive devices, batons and horses to 
clear the area.”). 
7. See Giovanni Russonello, Have Americans Warmed to Calls to ‘Defund 
the Police’?, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
 2020/07/03/us/politics/polling-defund-the-police.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 82YW-8RPK] (describing movement to defund police and summarizing 
polling data); Erik Ortiz & Kaleigh O’Boyle, The Next Wave of Statue 
Removals is Afoot. See Where They’re Being Taken Down Across the 
U.S., NBC News (updated July 1, 2020, 1:37 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
 news/us-news/2020-next-wave-statue-removals-afoot-map-n1230506 [https:// 
 perma.cc/Y6PD-AGH5] (providing interactive map of statue removals). 
8. As but one example, see The Association of American Law Schools, Law 
Deans Antiracist Clearinghouse Project, https://www.aals.org/antiracist-
clearinghouse/ [https://perma.cc/N8T6-MZ7A] (last visited July 8, 2020) 
(setting forth long-term vision for antiracist work in American law 
schools). 
9. This Article draws examples from central Appalachia; one might contend 
that those examples are further removed from the matter of racism 
because of the perception that the region is white. I both take the criticism 
and challenge readers to interrogate it. See Jillean McCommons, Appalachian 
Hillsides as Black Ecologies: Housing, Memory, and The Sanctified Hill 
Disaster of 1972, Black Perspectives, June 16, 2020, https://www 
 .aaihs.org/appalachian-hillsides-as-black-ecologies-housing-memory-and-the-
sanctified-hill-disaster-of-1972/ [https://perma.cc/LP8B-L2DX] (detailing 
Kentucky disaster that “exposed racial inequalities embedded in Appalachian 
landscapes”); see also Nick Brumfield, It’s Time to Talk About West 
Virginia’s Slaves, Expatalachians, Jan. 29, 2019, https://expatalachians 
 .com/its-time-to-talk-about-west-virginias-slaves [https://perma.cc/FGT8-
X2UV] (detailing West Virginia’s dark legacy of slavery); Mob Drives 200 
Negroes Out of the City of Corbin, The Courier-Journal, Nov. 1, 1919 
(relating to the expulsion of Black citizens from Corbin, Tennessee), 
available via Black in Appalachia, https://www.blackinappalachia.org/ 
 corbin-expulsion [https://perma.cc/8RZS-D9WK].  
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“bulldoz[ing] of indigenous rights and interests.”10 Further, the climate-
change crisis and the accompanying failure of meaningful action by 
government institutions has opened the door for urgent calls for drastic 
change.11 Scientists are exhorted to undertake mass acts of civil 
disobedience;12 Greta Thunberg and a host of other young people have 
shamed leaders for their seeming impotence;13 individuals continue to 
lock down their bodies to slow the construction of natural gas 
pipelines14—the list goes on.15 These activities draw on a strong 
tradition of direct action that has gone hand-in-hand with the 
development of environmental law, including many of the statutes that 
the EPA administers.16 But given that these activities often take place 
outside of ordinary legal processes, how can they be reconciled with 
notions of environmental governance? And how can insights from these 
activities further the aims of environmental justice? 
In this Article, I draw from a handful17 of historical and contem–
porary examples of direct action in central Appalachia as a way to (1) 
 
10.  Gabrielle Gurley, Native Americans Hail Oil and Gas Pipeline Decisions, 
The American Prospect (July 8, 2020), https://prospect.org/environment/ 
 native-americans-hail-oil-and-gas-pipeline-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 9LUZ-Q3MU]; see also Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, No. 1:16-cv-01534-JEB (D.D.C. July 6, 2020) (vacating agency’s 
grant of easement for Dakota Access pipeline and ordering pipeline to be 
shut down). 
11. Robert W. Adler, Natural Resource and Natural Law Part I: Prior 
Appropriation, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 739, 742 (2019) (referencing a 
“resurgence of civil disobedience to support natural law-based arguments 
regarding public lands and other resources”). 
12. Matthew Green, Scientists Endorse Mass Civil Disobedience to Force Climate 
Action, Reuters (Oct. 13, 2019, 10:12 PM), https://www.reuterscom/article/ 
 us-climate-change-scientists/scientists-endorse-mass-civil-disobedience-to-
force-climate-action-idUSKBN1WS01K [https://perma.cc/4UK6-AWL7] 
(describing efforts of the group Extinction Rebellion). 
13. Transcript: Greta Thunberg’s Speech at The U.N. Climate Action 
Summit, NPR (Sept. 23, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/ 
 23/763425863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-
summit [https://perma.cc/UCH2-B5EW] (“[Y]ou all come to us young 
people for hope. How dare you!”). 
14. In the words of one such protestor: “In times such as these, with the 
catastrophic effects of global warming accelerating at an alarming pace, 
it is imperative to act now.” Appalachians Against Pipelines, Facebook 
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/pg/appalachiansagainstpipelines/ 
 posts/2273237262788488 [https://perma.cc/7X92-N9YQ]. 
15. See Charles R. DiSalvo, Climate Disobedience, U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y (forthcoming) (offering a primer for effective climate-change 
disobedience). 
16. See Green, supra note 12. 
17. A more fulsome account is in progress, and in any event is beyond the 
scope of this symposium. 
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make concrete both the overlaps and the inherent tensions among 
protest activities and the environmental legal system,18 and (2) develop 
a research agenda that considers how direct action can enhance the 
missions of environmental protection and justice.19 Part I begins with 
definitional matters, orienting the reader to direct action and making 
note of its connection to the civil-society and environmental-justice 
literatures. Part II uses concrete examples to illustrate the heritage of 
protest in the Appalachian region and its relationship to the develop–
ment of environmental law. Part III outlines a research agenda to 
consider how protest can be better accounted for as environmental law 
moves to reincorporate social justice. 
I. Protest, Civil Disobedience, and Direct Action 
Protest, which is an act expressing disapproval, may take many 
forms. A familiar starting place is civil disobedience, which legal 
philosopher John Rawls defined as a public, nonviolent, conscientious 
political act done contrary to the law, with the purpose of bringing 
about change in the law or government policies.20 Such acts are 
communicative—hence the public component of the definition—in that 
Rawls compares them to public speech.21 These acts are necessarily 
nonviolent because otherwise they would conflict with their 
communicative force and, indeed, undermine it.22 
Furthermore, civil disobedience is fundamentally committed to the 
legal system in several ways. First, the civil disobedient accepts the 
consequences of her legal violation—for example, a protestor who serves 
probation and completes community service as part of a sentence for 
trespass or interfering with others’ property.23 This attribute also 
demonstrates the sincerity and politically conscientious nature of the 
 
18. This work owes an immense debt to the rich literature on civil 
disobedience and civil rights and the many individuals who made the 
ultimate sacrifice in the furtherance of equal rights for all. See, e.g., Mason 
Adams, Appalachia’s Deep History of Resistance, Yes! (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://www.yesmagazine.org/democracy/2019/09/26/resistance-protest-
coal-appalachia/ [https://perma.cc/T8MW-YS6Z]. 
19. A full exploration of these matters is the topic of a larger project in 
progress, tentatively titled Appalachia, Power, and Place (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
20. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 364 (1st ed. 1971). 
21. Id. at 366. 
22. Id.  
23. See Mike Gangloff, Pipeline Protest Brings Community Service, Roanoke 
Times (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.roanoke.com/news/crime/pipeline-
protest-brings-community-service/article_844a8906-5cd3-550c-8da2-a0852 
 ee5364f.html [https://perma.cc/ZC2M-PWXK] (recounting details of a 
Virginia Tech professor and Appalachian studies scholar Emily Satterwhite’s 
plea agreement). 
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act.24 Second, the civil disobedient’s nonviolent action evinces a 
commitment to the rule of law by minimizing harm caused by the act.25 
Finally, one’s commitment to the legal system is evinced by its ultimate 
purpose: to influence that system.26 
Many contemporary activists speak in terms of direct action rather 
than civil disobedience. Most generally, one may conceive of direct 
action as an umbrella term, including legal27 and illegal action, violent 
and nonviolent action.28 For purposes of this Article, there is little need 
to distinguish among the types of direct action, though clearly more is 
at stake—liberty and sometimes even life—for some protestors as 
compared to others.29 The point here is more basic. Though 
persistently prevalent in many conflicts over energy projects and the 
environment, direct action receives little attention in the mainstream 
environmental-law literature.30 Indeed, the law-violating aspect of civil 
disobedience is uncomfortable for many who are committed to the rule 
of law.31 And some states have ratcheted up their enforcement of 
criminal laws in response to acts of civil disobedience.32 Yet the philo–
 
24. Rawls, supra note 20, at 367 (“To be completely open and nonviolent is 
to give bond of one’s sincerity . . . .”). 
25. Id. at 366. 
26. Id. at 366–67. 
27. For example, a public-interest group might obtain the necessary permits 
to hold a protest on the steps of the county courthouse or organize a boycott 
of a product. See generally Civil Disobedience, Stan. Encyclopedia of 
Phil., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/ [https://perma 
 .cc/8N7K-D3WN] (last revised Dec. 20, 2013). 
28. See generally id. 
29. The distributional consequences of societal lines between “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” forms of protest are surely worthy of examination, but are 
regrettably beyond the scope of this Article. Compare Maia Niguel 
Hoskin, The Whiteness of Anti-Lockdown Protests, Vox (Apr. 25, 2020, 
12:20 PM) (critiquing the white privilege evinced by shutdown 
protestors), with Caleb Ecarma, Trump Doesn’t Think the Police 
Crackdown on Protests Has Been Brutal Enough, Vanity Fair (June 1, 
2020), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2020/4/25/21234774/coronavirus-
covid-19-protest-anti-lockdown, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/06/ 
 donald-trump-brutal-police-protest-crackdown [https://perma.cc/A7FE-
DRJ8] (describing, inter alia, police violence against Black Lives Matter 
Protestors). 
30. Cf. Adler, supra note 11. 
31. For example, they may be “demonized as threats to social order.” 
Kimberlee Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction: The Case for 
Civil Disobedience 155 (2012). 
32. See U.S. Protest Law Tracker, Int’l Ctr. for Not-For-Profit Law 
(Mar. 11, 2020) https://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/5W5F-XV5S] (depicting and describing state and federal initiatives 
since 2016 that “restrict the right to peaceful assembly”). 
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sophical literature finds moral justification for these activities;33 and the 
historical, anthropological, and sociological literatures provide deep 
accounts of resistance.34 I posit that we should engage with resistance 
as a fundamental component of a socially just civil society, letting it fill 
significant gaps left open by constitutional safeguards.35 
Moreover, environmental resistance might be understood within the 
framework of what Professor Jed Purdy calls the “long environmental 
justice movement,” which he argues dates to well before the 
institutionalization of environmental law that took place in the 1970s.36 
Indeed, the environmental-justice critique of environmental law—
which, among other things, is concerned with the distributional 
consequences of a legal regime that imposes disproportionate environ–
mental harms on people of color and low-income communities37—takes 
aim at environmental law’s mostly white, mostly middle- or upper-class, 
professional paradigm that includes national nongovernmental organ–
izations and relies on legal mechanisms such as participation in the 
administrative process and advocacy in the courts.38 Protest in 
environmental law shares the environmental-justice movement’s long 
heritage of community activism;39 and, in fact, protest persistently 
highlights the shortcomings of environmental law. 
 
33. Brownlee, supra note 31, at 159 (arguing that the protests of 
“conscientiously motivated campaigners” can “serve the interests of 
society by forcing a desirable re-examination of moral boundaries”). 
34. See sources cited infra note 35. 
35. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 
115 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 533–34 (2015) (describing civil society as a 
“subconstitutional counterweight” that constrains administrative agencies 
even when the judicial and legislative branches fall short); cf. Miriam 
Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 107, 108–10 (2018) (critiquing the role of civil society as 
a constraint on state government). Premised on respect for the positive 
law, civil society is thus consistent with the civil disobedient’s 
commitment to that same legal system. See Adler, supra note 11, at 779; 
cf. Dorothy Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 555, 556 (2000) (challenging views of civil society 
that fail to engage social justice and that engage a “conception of civil 
society more concerned with rescuing a disappearing way of life than with 
ending persistent economic and social disparities.”) 
36. See Jedediah Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement, 44 
Ecology L.Q. 809, 815 (2018). 
37. Shannon Elizabeth Bell, Fighting King Coal: The Challenges 
to Micromobilization in Central Appalachia 34–35 (2016). 
38. Purdy, supra note 36, at 818–24. 
39. See id. at 819 (“The theoretical commitments that characterize the 
perspective of environmental justice also express its origins in community 
activism.”). 
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II. From Protest to Law and Back Again 
The above definitions help outline the theory of protest and its 
place in law, but resistance stories vividly demonstrate the ways that 
such activities influence the very system being protested. In this Part, 
I draw from central Appalachia’s rich heritage of resistance40 to make 
plain the ways in which direct actions have influenced the development 
of law. Notably, these stories also resonate with the environmental-
justice critique of environmental law—they are set within some of the 
nation’s most impoverished counties41—and illuminate the ongoing role 
for resistance in the law’s evolution. There are far too many such stories 
to catalog here, so I have chosen to emphasize the following: (1) surface-
mining protest activities and the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act (SMCRA); (2) mountaintop-removal mining under 
the environmental laws and the ongoing role of protest; and (3) a brief 
mention of other contemporary resistance stories that set the stage for 
a broader research agenda that seeks a place for protest in reforming 
environmental law. 
 
40. Though regrettably beyond the scope of this Article, Central Appalachia’s 
resistance stories reveal a region far more nuanced than prevailing 
stereotypes would acknowledge. For a sampling of historical, anthropological, 
and other social-science literature focusing on resistance, see generally 
Coal Country: Rising Up Against Mountaintop Removal Mining 
(Shirley Stuart Burns et al. eds., 2009); Fighting Back in Appalachia 
(Stephen L. Fisher ed., 1993); Joseph D. Witt, Religion and Resistance 
in Appalachia: Faith and the Fight Against Mountaintop Removal 
Coal Mining (2016); Jessica Wilkerson, To Live Here, You Have to 
Fight (2019). See also Appalachian Reckoning: A Region Responds to 
Hillbilly Elegy (Anthony Harkins & Meredith McCarroll eds., 2019) 
(comprehensively refuting the major themes of the pop-culture book 
Hillbilly Elegy); Confronting Appalachian Stereotypes: Back Talk 
from an American Region (Dwight B. Billings et al. eds., 1999) 
(comprehensively refuting the major themes of Robert Schenkkan’s 1992 
play The Kentucky Cycle). 
41. Relative Poverty Rates in Appalachia, 2013–2017, Appalachian Regional 
Commission, https://www.arc.gov/research/MapsofAppalachia.asp?MAP_ 
 ID=151 [https://perma.cc/A3WS-NRT5] (last visited June 23, 2020). 
Moreover, Appalachians’ health and medical issues are unique even when 
compared to others of similar racial and socioeconomic circumstances. 
Barbara Ellen Smith et al., Appalachian Identity: A Roundtable Discussion—
Thoughts on the Importance of Identifying Appalachians, 38 Appalachian 
J. 56, 63 (2010); see also Don Manning-Miller, Racism and Organizing in 
Appalachia, in Fighting Back in Appalachia, supra note 40, at 57, 57–
66 (emphasizing that the matter of race has been neglected altogether in 
most community groups for Appalachia); Lisa R. Pruitt, Place Matters: 
Domestic Violence and Rural Difference, 23 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y 
347, 394–400 (2008) (collecting studies suggesting that incidents of 
domestic violence and an accompanying lack of social and legal infrastructure 
are particularly acute in Appalachia). 
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A. The Broad Form Deed and SMCRA 
It is well known in U.S. law that a fee simple estate may be severed 
into its surface estate and mineral estate. But what is lost in 
introductory property courses is that central Appalachia’s history 
cemented this axiom.42 Across the region, and dating from the 1800s to 
present day, many mining and timber interests have purchased land 
and mineral rights in the region.43 One particularly notorious agent in 
this ownership shift was John C.C. Mayo, architect of the broad form 
deed,44 which was prevalent in the late 1800s and early 1900s. This 
deed—which influentially established boilerplate language for severing 
mineral estates—included in the granting clause the right to “pollute 
water,” and “remov[e] or otherwise utilize[e]” “telephone lines” and 
“timber,” plus the ability to erect anything on the surface “deemed 
necessary and convenient” to accomplish the use of the mineral estate,45 
“without any liability whatsoever for damages to said lands.”46 These 
leases also included clauses reserving to the surface estate “free use of 
said land for agricultural purposes” consistent with the mineral rights 
being conveyed.47 
Of course, at the time most of these deeds were granted, 
underground mining was the norm.48 It was only later that surface 
mining became both practicable and widespread. Surface owners were 
thus alarmed when mineral owners increasingly stripped the surfaces, 
 
42. E.g., Kincaid v. McGowan, 4 S.W. 802, 803–04 (Ky. 1887) (recognizing 
distinct surface and mineral estates). 
43. This is true for both hard minerals (i.e., coal), and fugacious minerals 
(e.g., oil and natural gas). An influential study by the Appalachian 
Regional Commission found that 70% of mineral rights in eighty counties 
across six states were owned by corporations. See Appalachian Land 
Ownership Task Force, Land Ownership Patterns and Their 
Impacts on Appalachian Communities: A Survey of 80 Counties 
37–40 (describing history of mineral purchasing); id. at 51 (reporting 
minerals acres owned by state and by type of owner). 
44. See Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 282–83 (Ky. 1993) (describing the 
origins and interpretations of broad form deeds, or “Mayo deeds”); see 
also Robert M. Pfeiffer, Kentucky’s New Broad Form Deed Law—Is It 
Constitutional?, 1 J. Min. L. & Pol’y 57, 61 (1985) (describing Mayo’s 
rise from poverty to great wealth). 
45. For a 1911 exemplar, see McIntire v. Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298, 298–
99 (Ct. App. Ky. 1921). 
46. For a 1921 exemplar, see Pennsylvania v. Fitzmartin, 102 A.2d 893, 894 
(Pa. 1954). 
47. McIntire, 227 S.W. at 344. 
48. Pfeiffer, supra note 44. 
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destroying homes, agriculture lands, family cemeteries, and more.49 
Consider this statement of one activist: 
I didn’t know much about strip mining. I don’t guess that 
anybody did from the mountains until they got in there and 
started destroying. What I knew was deep mining. It wasn’t so 
destructive. But then when we seen what strip mining could do, 
I think that’s when people really got concerned and got afraid 
that they’d really just bury the mountain people alive.50  
It is typical, when a mineral estate is conveyed, that there goes 
along with it a dominant easement over the surface; otherwise, there 
would be no way to effectuate the use of the mineral estate.51 Today, 
this easement is subject to various reasonableness limitations that 
protect pre-existing uses (like agriculture and family dwellings),52 and 
require paying damages to the surface owner should the use become 
unreasonable.53 But such was not always the law, and in particular, 
Kentucky doggedly read the broad form deeds to obviate any need for 
reasonable use or damages. Consider this statement of Kentucky’s 
highest court when it construed the broad form language referenced 
above: “Undoubtedly, under the plain terms of the deed, the Marian 
Coal Company has the right and could by showing the necessity or 
convenience thereof use and occupy the whole surface of the land in 
question even to excluding the plaintiff and taking his house and 
garden . . . .”54 
The effect of this broad deed language and the courts’ even broader 
construction of it was stunning. Surface owners found themselves 
without remedy for complete losses of their land, and the environmental 
destruction was unfathomable, causing “drastic reshaping of the 
surface,”55 “massive landslides,”56 water pollution, and isolation of land 
including “entire mountaintops.”57 Indeed, there arose a broad coalition 
 
49. See Mary Beth Bingman, Stopping the Bulldozers: What Difference Did 
it Make?, in Fighting Back in Appalachia, supra note 40, at 17, 20. 
50. Id. at 19. 
51. Pfeiffer, supra note 44, at 57. 
52. E.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (describing 
the rule of accommodation for pre-existing surface uses). 
53. Id. at 623 (referencing damages). 
54. McIntire v. Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298, 300 (Ky. 1921). 
55. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Surface Mining and Our Environment: 
A Special Report to the Nation 51 (1967). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 54. 
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of activists hoping to abolish strip mining altogether.58 As one 
Kentuckian protestor put it, “in the late 1960s and early 1970s, we 
wanted to stop, not regulate, strip mining.”59 
Among these activists, the dual commitments to freedom in the use 
of one’s land60 and protection of the environment ran deep.61 An 
especially vivid story is that of a small group of individuals—mostly 
women—who occupied a strip mine into the night in Knott County, 
Kentucky in 1972.62 They faced jeering miners, cold rain, and rumors of 
violence while camped in front of a bulldozer.63 Ultimately, police 
escorted them off the mountain after one of their ranks—Doris 
Shepherd, who had left early to take her sisters home—called the police. 
Down in the town, she had been threatened with rape and murder, and 
had watched what appeared to be an organized mob terrorizing their 
community.64 
Although these protestors succeeded in shutting down the Knott 
County mine, they later reflected that they “weren’t sure what 
difference it all made.”65 Early efforts to abolish strip mining were 
vulnerable to the coal companies’ local use of violence and red-baiting;66 
gave way to corporate lobbying (western energy companies also rose in 
power during this period);67 fell prey to geopolitics (the 1973 oil embargo 
led to a shift in emphasis on using coal for U.S. energy needs);68 and 
battled economic pressures (central Appalachia had few other large 
employers).69 Indeed, whereas the labor and environmental movements 
 
58. See Ken Hechler, How Congress Enabled Mountaintop Removal, in Coal 
Country: Rising Up Against Mountaintop Removal Mining, supra 
note 40, at 63, 63–65 (essay by former West Virginian member of U.S. 
House of Representatives describing early congressional efforts toward 
abolition of strip mining). 
59. Bingman, supra note 49, at 27. 
60. Here I refer to primarily agricultural and homestead-surface uses. 
61. They continue to do so, as illustrated infra notes 82–88. 
62. The story is recounted in the first person in Bingman, supra note 49.  
63. Id. at 17–18. 
64. Id. at 25–27; see also id. at 21 (documenting further examples of 
resistance, both violent and nonviolent). 
65. Id. at 18–19. 
66. Id. at 23; see also Guy Carawan & Candie Carawan, Sowing on the 
Mountain: Nurturing Cultural Roots and Creativity for Community Change, 
in Fighting Back in Appalachia, supra note 40, at 245, 251 (describing 
Edith Easterling, an outspoken critic of strip mining, being called before 
the Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee). 
67. See Hechler, supra note 58, at 66–68 (describing efforts by western members 
to block abolition legislation). 
68. Id. at 68. 
69. Bingman, supra note 49, at 27–29. 
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had been aligned in opposing strip mining early on, the narrative of 
jobs versus the environment arose out of this period and persists 
today.70 Overall, single-issue grassroots social movements found them–
selves ill-prepared to take on these myriad forces.71 
Arising out of these events, SMCRA became law in 1977 at the 
behest of the coal industry,72 and received a lukewarm endorsement 
from President Carter even just after he signed it.73 It also garnered 
criticism from within central Appalachia, exemplified by the following 
perspective of the grassroots group Save Our Cumberland Mountains 
(SOCM): 
Congress incorporated into the new law numerous compromises 
worked out between national environmental groups and the coal 
industry. SOCM never agreed to those compromises, and some 
members felt that they had been sold out by the national groups 
that had depended heavily on local groups . . . to lobby and 
provide testimony for Congressional study committees.74  
 
70. Hechler, supra note 58, at 66 (describing congressional witness Arnold 
Miller, a miner who later became president of the United Mine Workers 
and at the time held abolitionist views); Ann M. Eisenberg, Just 
Transitions, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 273, 286 (2019) (describing activist Tony 
Mazzocchi’s efforts to create “powerful labor-environmental alliances”); 
Purdy, supra note 36, at 846–47 (documenting early union opposition to 
strip mining and other despoliation of the environment); cf. Bragg v. W. 
Va. Mining Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 285 (4th Cir. 2001) (challenging a state 
agency’s issuance of mountaintop removal permits in a case where the 
EPA aligned itself with the plaintiffs (individual citizens and environmental 
groups) against “the coal mining companies, who are allied with the 
United Mine Workers of America and the West Virginia State political 
establishment, all of whom favor current mining practices.”). 
71. Bingman, supra note 49, at 29. 
72. Hechler, supra note 58, at 66 (“[T]he coal industry spread the word that 
it would agree to a mild form of regulation to quiet the public uproar for 
abolition.”). The industry nevertheless challenged the statute on takings 
grounds. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 
264 (1981) (rejecting challenges to SMCRA’s constitutionality). 
73. James A. McDaniel, The Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977: 
An Analysis, 2 Harv. Envt’l L. Rev. 288, 288 & n.4 (1978) (citing 
Remarks on Signing H.R. 2 into Law, 13 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 
1162 (Aug. 3, 1977) (reporting President Carter’s statement that some of 
the Act’s features had to be “watered down”)). It was not until much 
later that Kentucky, as a result of an amendment to its constitution, 
finally put an end to the broad interpretations of the broad form deed. 
See Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) (upholding the 
constitutional amendment and recounting its history). 
74. Bill Allen, Save Our Cumberland Mountains: Growth and Change Within 
a Grassroots Organization, in Fighting Back in Appalachia, supra 
note 40, at 85, 89–90; see also Bell, supra note 37, at 25 (referencing the 
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What compromises does SMCRA make? Like most other 
environmental laws, it is designed to permit pollution, albeit in a 
regulated fashion (a point to which I return shortly).75 SMRCA’s means 
of regulating surface mining relies on the federal government as the 
initial standard-setter, but anticipates that state governments will 
apply for authority to implement federal law.76 Once such authority is 
granted, it is further anticipated that the federal government will 
exercise only a very limited oversight role.77 Even more than traditional 
cooperative federalism models,78 therefore, this governance scheme is 
susceptible to industry capture at the state level—a problem that has 
plagued coal-producing states for more than a century.79 Nevertheless, 
 
shift to national environmental movements dominated by middle-class 
professionals who espoused “the reformist goal of federal regulation policy, 
rather than abolition legislation”). 
75. It is only the rare law that prohibits pollution. But see Robert V. Percival, 
Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 
21, 57–66 (2005) (describing the ban on leaded gasoline and the phase-out 
of chlorofluorocarbons). 
76. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2012) (“because of the diversity in terrain, 
climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject 
to mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing, 
authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and 
reclamation operations subject to this chapter should rest with the 
States”). 
77. See id. § 1253(a) (providing that states have the exclusive authority, if 
they assume it, to regulate surface coal mining); Bragg v. W. Va. Coal 
Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 293 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n contrast to other 
‘cooperative federalism’ statutes, SMCRA exhibits extraordinary 
deference to the States.”). 
78. The literature is vast in itemizing both pros and cons. For a comparison 
of the key provisions of SMCRA with those of the Clean Air Act, Clean 
Water Act, and Mine Safety & Health Act, see McDaniel, supra note 73, 
at 318–27. 
79. See, e.g., W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 161 F. Supp. 2d 676, 
679 (W.D. W. Va. 2001) (“Since at least 1991, however, OSM has known 
officially that the West Virginia reclamation bonding program failed (and 
today continues to fail) to satisfy the federal statutory requirement for 
adequate funding.”); Ryan M. Yonk et al., Exploring the Policy 
Implications of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 8 
Resources (Special Issue) 25, at 34–35 (describing public-choice 
incentives built into SMCRA’s bonding requirements that result in under-
bonding). In fact, SMCRA was in part justified due to states’ failures to 
sufficiently regulate the coal industry. See McDaniel, supra note 73, at 
294–96 (describing the significant shortcomings of state regulation of 
surface mining leading up to SMCRA); David B. Spence, Federalism, 
Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 505 (2013) (noting the SMCRA licensing scheme 
was deemed necessary by Congress “because of the importance of the coal 
industry to the national economy and because state environmental 
regulation had failed”). 
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SMCRA relies on state mining agencies to issue permits to surface-mine 
operators, ensure they are properly bonded, conduct inspections, and 
set standards for restoring the surface of the mine once mining activities 
cease.80 Additionally, SMRCA requires authorized states to administer 
a fund to restore abandoned mines.81 
Should a citizen or other entity wish to challenge a state agency’s 
compliance with the federal standards, prospects are quite constrained. 
Would-be plaintiffs are limited to suing in state court (if authorized) or 
to petitioning the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement (OSMRE) to revoke state authority.82 Generally, because 
primacy states—those that have received authorization to administer 
SMCRA—bear the exclusive regulatory responsibility, their laws do not 
become federal laws and may not be enforced in federal court.83 
Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia are all primacy states.84 Citizens 
do have a statutory right to request an inspection,85 and OSMRE’s 
annual oversight process contemplates citizen involvement.86 And there 
are procedures available for OSMRE to withdraw a state’s authority, 
though such a remedy is rare.87 
 
80. For a relatively contemporaneous overview, see generally McDaniel, supra 
note 73. 
81. Id. at 301. 
82. Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 317, 331–32 
(3d Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that SMCRA does not waive state immunity 
from suit in federal court and noting that the federal government could 
revoke state authority); Bragg, 248 F.3d at 295–98 (concluding that suit 
filed against state agency was not within exception to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity identified in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), 
and noting that oversight could be obtained if either the federal 
government were to revoke the state’s authority or the plaintiffs were to 
sue in state court). 
83. This is a significant difference from true cooperative federalism regimes. 
E.g., Penn. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, 297 F.3d at 326–27 (distinguishing 
the Clean Water Act on this basis). 
84. Regulating Coal Mines, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & 
Enf’t, https://www.osmre.gov/programs/rcm.shtm [https://perma.cc/ 
 6SXT-LCLD] (last modified July 9, 2019). 
85. See 30 U.S.C. § 1267(h) (2012); Off. of Surface Mining Reclamation 
and Enf’t, OMB No. 1029-0118, Citizen’s Request for an 
Inspection Form (2011). 
86. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1267, 1271 (2012). 
87. This observation likely obscures a deeper story. See, e.g., W. Va. 
Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 161 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682–83 (W.D. W. 
Va. 2001) (holding unlawful OSM’s ten-year delay in failing to initiate 
withdrawal proceedings); Termination of Federal Enforcement of Parts of 
the Missouri Permanent Regulatory Program and Return of Full 
Regulatory Authority to the State of Missouri, 71 Fed. Reg. 5548, 5548 
(Feb. 1, 2006) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 925) (returning full 
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Despite that SMCRA created a baseline regulatory process with 
avenues for federal enforcement and citizen participation, SOCM’s 
critique continues to hold force. Not only are the state regulatory 
programs open to a variety of general criticisms,88 but SMCRA enables 
rather than halts the most destructive methods of surface mining, which 
continue to devastate Appalachian communities, destroy mountains, 
and eradicate species. The culprit is mountaintop-removal mining, 
which returns this story once again to the role of protest. 
B. Mountaintop-Removal Mining and the Continuing Role of Protest 
Mountaintop-removal mining is a particularly destructive surface 
mining method, the use of which increased in the 1990s and 2000s due 
to the availability of very heavy equipment and the market push for 
low-sulfur coal.89 It involves, quite literally, blowing the tops off of 
mountains and placing the overburden—that is, the sixteen tons of 
removed earth for every ton of extracted coal—into adjacent valleys as 
“valley fills.”90 But those adjacent valleys hold the headwaters of 
streams, which are part of the rich ecosystems that contribute to 
Appalachia’s reputation as the “Noah’s Ark of North America.”91 To 
 
authority to Missouri after withdrawing partial authority for failure to 
fund and staff several state program areas); Return of Full Regulatory 
Authority to the State of Oklahoma, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,922, 36,922 (Oct. 2, 
1987) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 936) (returning authority to 
Oklahoma after withdrawal for numerous deficiencies in state’s 
implementation). See generally Hammond & Markell, supra note 3 
(presenting the findings of a study that considered all known petitions to 
the EPA to revoke state authority, including results demonstrating that 
such petitions can result in improved state regulatory performance even 
if the petitions are not granted). 
88. Under President Reagan, Interior Secretary James Wyatt removed 
environmentalists from the Office of Surface Mining’s key leadership 
positions and developed numerous industry-friendly policies that 
continued to harm communities and owners of the land’s surface. Hechler, 
supra note 58, at 69; see also Robert A. Beck, The Current Effort in 
Congress to Amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977 (SMCRA), 8 Fordham Envt’l L.J. 607, 607–10 (1997) (describing 
early political efforts to dial back protections). 
89. See Bell, supra note 37, at 25–26 (2016) (describing dragline excavators, 
which are more than twenty stories tall). 
90. Earthshots: Satellite Images of Environmental Change: Mountaintop 
Mining, U.S. Geological Survey, https://earthshots.usgs.gov/earthshots/ 
 node/103#ad-image-0-0 [https://perma.cc/NDN5-LAZU] (last visited 
June 23, 2020).  
91. Patrick Reis, Are Endangered Species Being Sacrificed for Coal in 
Appalachia?, Sci. Am. (Aug. 10, 2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
 article/endangered-species-coal-appalachia-mountaintop-removal/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/D9KE-6NT6]. See generally Notice of the Release of Final 
Reports on the Effects Of Mountaintop Mines and Valley Fills on Aquatic 
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date, some 2,000 miles of Appalachian headwaters have been destroyed, 
over a million acres of forest have been removed, and the rich 
biodiversity of the region has been imperiled.92 Moreover, the 
destruction of vegetation and natural water courses has led to 
pronounced and deadly flash flooding in the valleys at the bases of the 
mountains.93 
Perhaps SMCRA’s greatest blow to the environment is that it 
permits mountaintop-removal mining. This was not a surprise or 
accident: 
This amendment would permit the mountaintop and valley fill 
type of surface mining presently used at several model mines in 
West Virginia creating useful plateaus without highwalls. 
Mountaintop mining produces flat land needed in many hilly 
regions with minimum damage to the environment. This is a form 
of mining which should increase, not decline . . . .94  
This approach was not born of naiveté, a lack of scientific 
information, or a lack of local citizen engagement.95 It was an inten–
tional component of the SMCRA model. 
 
Ecosystems of the Central Appalachian Coalfields and a Field-Based 
Aquatic Life Benchmark for Conductivity in Central Appalachian 
Streams, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,938, 30,938 (May 27, 2011) (documenting loss 
of headwaters resources, degraded water quality, water toxicity, harm to 
aquatic ecosystems, and limitations of restoration). Streams do not 
recover following reclamation. See generally Emily S. Bernhardt & 
Margaret A. Palmer, The Environmental Costs of Mountaintop Mining 
Valley Fill Operations for Aquatic Ecosystems of the Central 
Appalachians, 1223 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 39–57 (2011) (explaining 
effects of mountaintop removal). 
92. Ecological Impacts of Mountaintop Removal, Appalachian Voices, 
https://www.appvoices.org/end-mountaintop-removal/ecology [https:// 
 perma.cc/4GSC-AY6b] (last visited June 23, 2020); see also James Wickham 
et al., The Overlooked Terrestrial Impacts of Mountaintop Mining, 63 
BioScience 335, 336 (2013) (describing significantly high biodiversity in 
the region). 
93. Bell, supra note 37, at 26–28. 
94. Hechler, supra note 58, at 68 (quoting West Virginia representative, John 
M. Slack); see also Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: 
Hearings on S. 7 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources of 
the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong. 520 (1977) 
(statement of Gov. John D. Rockefeller) (“The proposed legislation does not, 
in my judgment, adequately allow for the mountaintop removal method, 
proven through practice in West Virginia, to be environmentally 
equivalent to the contour method of surface mining.”). 
95. See Hechler, supra note 58, at 68 (noting that the author raised the issue 
of environmental and social damages during debates); H.R. Rep. No. 95-
218 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 615 (“In recent years, 
some mountaintop removal operations have caused serious environmental 
problems in the Appalachian area.”). 
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SMCRA’s approach to mountaintop-removal mining is to rely on 
exceptions. The state generally requires that reclamation activities 
must “restore the approximate original contour of the land,”96 unless 
“the volume of overburden is large relative to the thickness of the coal 
deposit.”97 In such circumstances, the surface is to be graded and 
revegetated, but the permit need only require a “level plateau.”98 At 
the very end of the Obama Administration, OSMRE briefly 
strengthened its interpretation of SMCRA’s requirements via the 
Stream Protection Rule, which required deeper protections for 
hydrologic areas outside the permit areas, restoration of a 100-foot 
buffer zone along waterways, and additional actions by mining 
operators to protect natural resources.99 Congress, however, quickly 
killed the rule using the truncated procedures set forth in the 
Congressional Review Act.100 
The exceptions run beyond SMCRA. For example, the Endangered 
Species Act requires that federally licensed activities must not jeopar–
dize endangered or threatened species.101 But a 1996 biological opinion 
issued by the Department of Interior and OSMRE concludes that so 
long as a coal operator complies with SMCRA’s requirements, “surface 
coal mining and reclamation operations . . . are not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of listed or proposed species, and are not likely 
to result in the destruction or adverse modification of designated or 
proposed critical habitats.”102 This opinion was briefly withdrawn under 
the Obama Administration, but has since been reinstated.103 Meanwhile, 
 
96. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2012). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. § 1265(c)(2). 
99. See generally Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066, 93,066, 93,074 
(Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 
779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, and 827). 
100. Congressional Nullification of the Stream Protection Rule Under the 
Congressional Review Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 54,924 (Nov. 17, 2017) (to be 
codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 
800, 816, 817, 824, and 827) (effectuating administrative removal of 
agency rules related to Stream Protection Rule). 
101. Endangered Species Act § 1(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (2012). 
102. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Biological Opinion and Conference 
Report 10 (1996). 
103. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Memorandum of Understanding 
Regarding Improved ESA Coordination on Surface Coal Mining 
and Reclamation Operations 2 n.2 (2016) (referencing superseded 
biological opinion); Lawsuit Launched to Force Trump Administration to 
Protect Endangered Species from Coal Mining in Appalachia, Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity (May 10, 2019), https://biologicaldiversity.org/ 
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numerous proposed and listed species are vulnerable to ongoing mining 
operations.104 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) also has a role to play, given how 
mountaintop-removal mining impacts waterways. When overburden is 
placed into mountain waters, it triggers the permitting requirements in 
CWA § 404, which are administered by the Army Corps of Engineers.105 
Even if the Corps grants a 404 permit, however, the EPA can veto the 
permit if it finds there will be an “unacceptable adverse effect” on 
environmental resources.106 The EPA has exercised its veto authority 
once, as described in the saga of Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA.107 
There, the Corps approved a coal company’s permit application to 
dispose of fill from a mountaintop coal mine into three streams and 
their tributaries. During the National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA) process in 2002, the EPA voiced concerns about the impacts 
of mountaintop removal; but in 2006, the EPA declined to exercise its 
veto power, and the Corps issued the permit in 2007.108 
Then, in 2009, the EPA initiated proceedings to exercise its veto 
authority,109 and thereafter withdrew its approval of two of the streams 
as disposal sites, which effectively prohibited the coal company from 
using them.110 The EPA’s final determination provides a sense of the 
scope of the project: as “one of the largest mountaintop mining projects 
ever authorized in West Virginia,” it stood poised to bury nearly seven-
 
 w/news/press-releases/appalachian-endangered-species-and-coal-mining-
2019-05-10/ [https://perma.cc/G7S2-52QM] (describing facts alleged in 
lawsuit). 
104. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native 
Species That Are Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened; 
Annual Notification of Findings on Resubmitted Petitions; Annual 
Description of Progress on Listing Actions, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,246 (Dec. 2, 
2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012) (setting forth the Secretary of the Army’s 
permitting authority). 
106. Id. § 1344(c) (setting forth the EPA’s authority to prohibit or withdraw 
the specified disposal site whenever, following notice and a hearing, the 
Administrator determines that the specification will have an “unacceptable 
adverse effect” on specified environmental resources). 
107. 714 F.3d 608, 609 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
108. Id. at 610. 
109. Id.; see also Notice of Final Determination of the Assistant Administrator 
for Water Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act Concerning 
the Spruce No. 1 Mine, Logan County, WV, 76 Fed. Reg. 3126, 3126 (Jan. 
19, 2011). 
110. Mingo Logan Coal Co., 714 F.3d at 609. 
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and-a-half miles of streams with 110 million cubic yards of excess soil.111 
Among the comments collected by the EPA were those of the Fish & 
Wildlife Service (FWS), which agreed with the EPA’s concerns and 
noted its persistent concerns about the loss of headwater streams and 
habitat.112 The EPA’s final determination described the “direct burial” 
of “all wildlife in this watershed that utilize these streams for all or part 
of their life cycles,” and noted that the streams were “consistent with 
the ecological richness of high-quality Appalachian headwater stream 
systems”113—some of the “last remaining” in that area.114 Further, the 
fills would result in significant releases of downstream pollution, causing 
additional harm to downstream wildlife communities.115 
The coal company challenged the EPA’s post-permit-issuance 
exercise of its veto and argued that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious.116 In the first phase of litigation, the D.C. Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to Mingo Logan, 
holding that the statutory text permitted the EPA’s post-permit veto.117 
In the second phase of litigation, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the EPA on the basis that the 
EPA had not acted arbitrarily and capriciously.118 
This recounting of legal developments underscores the tenacity and 
commitment of a variety of public interest attorneys and environmental 
non-governmental organizations.119 Consider, however, that protest too 
has played a critical role in the long, slow battle against destructive 
mining practices, a battle that dates to the earliest days of strip mining. 
Just as in the days prior to the passage of SMCRA, mountaintop-
removal mining has inspired civil disobedience and other protest 
 
111. Notice of Final Determination of the Assistant Administrator for Water 
Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act Concerning the Spruce 
No. 1 Mine, Logan County, WV, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3127. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 3127–28. The EPA also made note of the 404(b)(1) requirements 
and offered that the mine would “cause or contribute to significant 
degradation of waters of the United States (especially when considered in 
the context of the significant cumulative losses and impairment of streams 
across the Central Appalachian ecoregion).” Id. at 3128. 
115. Id. at 3127. 
116. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 608, 609 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
117. Id. 
118. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 F.3d 710, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
119. E.g., Mountaintop Removal Mining, Appalachian Mountain Voices, 
http://www.appalmad.org/our-work/coal/mountaintop-removal/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/7PBU-HTNG] (last visited June 23, 2020); End Mountaintop 
Removal Coal Mining, Appalachian Voices http://appvoices.org/end-
mountaintop-removal/ [https://perma.cc/4CY9-GTES] (last visited June 
23, 2020). 
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activities—instances of individuals locking themselves to equipment, 
standing in the paths of equipment, and picketing coal companies’ 
shareholder meetings.120 Just as Doris Shepherd and her fellow activists 
hoped to do, many of the anti-mountaintop-removal activists raised 
awareness of the problem on a national scale—and have kept it there.121 
In some circumstances, these activities have bought time: the Mingo 
Logan saga began in 2002 and did not end until 2016, when the D.C. 
Circuit finally upheld the EPA’s veto.122 Meanwhile, activists blocked 
equipment, lobbied state agencies and office-holders, and pushed the 
Obama Administration to put a stop to mountaintop-removal mining.123 
In an echo of the past, it is notable that abolition continues to seem 
out of grasp: the short-lived Stream Protection Rule permitted 
continued mountaintop removal, much to the frustration of activists. 
Another development in protest activities bears emphasis and 
brings this Article back to where it began: public engagement in 
environmental decision-making. The mountaintop-removal resistance 
has extended beyond “traditional” protest activities and marshalled 
citizen science as a powerful tool that fills gaps and strengthens civil 
society oversight of governance activities. 
C. Citizen Science as Protest 
Citizen science is broadly defined as the involvement of the public 
in scientific research. Researchers have documented a boom in citizen 
science, owing to advances in technology, an increasingly sophisticated 
public, limited agency capacity, data gaps, and growing attention to 
community-level conditions and environmental justice.124 Citizen 
science is powerful: according to one report, “[h]alf of what we know 
about the effect of climate change on bird migrations comes from citizen 
science, though it may not be named as such.”125 Even so, in the 
environmental field it is often associated with river-keeper groups,126 
 
120. Consider the list of Mountain Justice activities set forth on Wikipedia. 
Mountain Justice, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mountain_ 
 Justice_(organization) [https://perma.cc/9HRK-PRVE] (last edited Apr. 
20, 2020). 
121. See Witt, supra note 40, at 38 (emphasizing success in increasing awareness, 
but noting a continuing inability to stop mountaintop removal mining). 
122. Mingo Logan Coal Co., 714 F.3d at 610–16.  
123. See Mountain Justice, supra note 120. 
124. See George Wyeth et al., The Impact of Citizen Environmental Science 
in the United States, 49 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,237, 10,241–43 (2019). 
125. Id. at 10,239. 
126. See, e.g., Friends of the Cheat, Straight from the River—Continuous 
Water Quality Data, Cheat.org, https://www.cheat.org/our-work/mapping-
monitoring-program/straight-from-the-river-continuous-water-quality-data/ 
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which leverage the EPA’s regulatory demand that states must consider 
citizen-generated water-quality information when maintaining their 
lists of impaired waters pursuant to the CWA.127 In addition to being 
an indicator of natural conditions, however, citizen science can also 
further community engagement, promote education, and impact 
regulatory decisions and enforcement.128 
Returning to the story of mountaintop mining, note these examples 
of citizen science conducted by community groups whose members are 
also active in traditional protest activities. The Appalachian Mountain–
top Patrol is an initiative of Radical Action for Mountains’ and Peoples’ 
Survival (RAMPS) that uses drones, video cameras, and water-quality 
meters to both collect data and enhance the ability of citizens to tell 
their stories.129 A collaboration between researchers at SkyTruth, Duke 
University, and Appalachian Voices has created a map depicting 
locations of surface mines in central Appalachia, making powerful visual 
data available to all.130 And the Appalachian Citizens Enforcement 
Project makes public the results of citizens’ water-quality monitoring 
throughout coal country.131 The list goes on. 
Indeed, some of these same organizations are also actively opposing 
the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) and Atlantic Coast Pipeline 
(ACP) projects, which have been embroiled in substantial litigation.132 
 
[https://perma.cc/FN7K-4F3T] (last visited June 23, 2020) (presenting 
examples of citizen science). See also Waterkeeper Alliance, https:// 
 waterkeeper.org/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/Y3MJ-D3SA] (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2020). The story of the Cheat River’s restoration is part of a 
larger project that is regrettably beyond the scope of this Article. 
127. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (2011); see also Wyeth et al., supra note 124, at 10,243 
(describing the Clean Water Act’s provisions and implementing 
regulations). 
128. Wyeth et al., supra note 124, at 10,254 (noting its use for research, 
management, and, perhaps, regulatory standard-setting as well). 
129. Projects, Radical Action for Mountains’ & People’s Survival, 
http://rampscampaign.org/projects/ [https://perma.cc/JP4G-HMHG] (last 
visited June 23, 2020). 
130. Mountain Top Mining, SkyTruth, http://skytruthmtr.appspot.com/# 
[https://perma.cc/C4C3-D6YU] (last visited June 23, 2020). 
131. Appalachian Citizens Enforcement Project, http://www.ace-
project.org [https://perma.cc/E3SW-JA5B]. 
132. On July 5, 2020, Dominion Energy and Duke Energy announced their 
decision to cancel the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, citing legal uncertainties. 
Press Release, Dominion Energy and Duke Energy Cancel the Atlantic 
Coast Pipeline, July 5, 2020, at https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/ 
 dominion-energy-and-duke-energy-cancel-the-atlantic-coast-pipeline [https:// 
 perma.cc/5GGW-ECGM]. This development has been widely celebrated 
as a triumph of grassroots resistance. See, e.g., Podcast, Slate, How 
Activists Brought Down a Massive Gas Pipeline (July 8, 2020, 5:00 PM), 
https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/dominion-energy-and-duke-energy-
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The entire MVP, for example, is under a stop-work order by FERC 
while further endangered species analyses are completed.133 Among the 
MVP protest activities are a prolonged tree-sit—the Yellow Finch sit 
near Yellow Finch Lane in Elliston, Virginia, marked its one-year 
anniversary in the fall of 2019, and was still in operation as of summer 
2020, thanks to the help of supporters on the ground.134 Further, over 
forty people have been arrested for their direct actions associated with 
 
cancel-the-atlantic-coast-pipeline [https://perma.cc/M8NS-75GC]. Litigation 
has also been fierce and persistent. See U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture 
River Preservation Ass’n (Nos. 18-1584 & 18-1587 (U.S. June 15, 2020) 
(holding that the Forest Service has the authority under the Mineral 
Leasing Act to grant rights-of-way through lands that are traversed by 
the Appalachian Trail in national forests); Emily Hammond, U.S. Forest 
Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association: A Limited—And 
Perhaps Hollow—Victory for a Pipeline, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the 
Docket (Oct. Term 2019), at https://www.gwlr.org/u-s-forest-service-v-
cowpasture-river-preservation-association-a-limited-and-perhaps-hollow-
victory-for-a-pipeline/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign 
 =u-s-forest-service-v-cowpasture-river-preservation-association-a-limited-
and-perhaps-hollow-victory-for-a-pipeline [https://perma.cc/H7AM-2HJA] 
(discounting impact of favorable ruling for ACP given numerous 
remaining hurdles); see also Friends of Buckingham v. Air Pollution 
Control Bd., 947 F.3d 68, 92–93 (4th Cir. 2020) (invalidating a state 
agency’s permit for an Atlantic Coast Pipeline compressor station for 
failure to adequately consider the environmental-justice implications); 
Sierra Club v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 909 F.3d 635, 655 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that the Corps lacked authority to allow the MVP to proceed 
with construction under terms of nationwide permit); Sierra Club, Inc. v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 897 F.3d 582, 602–03 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that the 
Forest Service failed to comply with the NEPA and other statutory 
mandates in allowing pipeline construction across the Jefferson National 
Forest); Appalachian Voices v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (FERC), 
No. 17-1271, 2019 WL 847199, at *1–3 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2019) (rejecting 
a challenge to the FERC’s issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity to the Mountain Valley Pipeline). In other significant 
pipeline news, on July 6, 2020, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia ordered the Dakota Access Pipeline’s permit vacated and 
operations to cease given the court’s prior holding that the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers had violated NEPA in permitting the pipeline. 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Amy Corps of Engr’rs, No. 1-16-CV-
01534-JEB (D.D.C. July 8, 2020). This development was also a triumph 
of sustained resistance. Maia Wikler, The Fate of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline Proves Activism Works, InStyle (July 9, 2020, 6:22 PM), 
https://www.instyle.com/lifestyle/dakota-access-pipeline-activism-works. 
133. Letter from FERC to Matthew Eggerding, Counsel, Mountain Valley 
Pipeline LLC 2 (Oct. 15, 2019) (ordering work stoppage pending 
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service). 
134. See Michael Sainato, Through Snow and Rain, Tree Sitters Continue to 
Fight a Gas Pipeline, Am. Prospect (Dec. 23, 2019), https://prospect.org/ 
 environment/through-snow-rain-tree-sitters-fight-gas-pipeline/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/LQW6-CMBJ]. 
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the protest movement.135 And finally, citizens in both Virginia and West 
Virginia have received training and regularly conduct data collection to 
monitor the pipeline’s construction route, detect apparent water-quality 
violations, share the data with enforcement authorities and the public, 
and use it in impact litigation.136 
It should be clear that these activities do not take place in a 
vacuum; they are part of coordinated efforts to resist fossil-fuel 
development in central Appalachia. They are the continuing legacy of 
Appalachian resistance, a movement that extends far beyond the stories 
collected in this Article.137 Viewed against the paradigmatic ideal of civil 
disobedience and direct action, citizen science aligns with the 
communicative, nonviolent, and conscientious nature of political acts 
that are intended to bring about change in the law or government 
policies.138 By openly collecting data and making it public, these citizens 
communicate information. It is nonviolent and undertaken as part of a 
conscientious commitment to environmental and social-justice 
principles. And its purpose is to change the legal regime such that goals 
of environmental protection and justice will be achieved. 
III. Toward a Research Agenda for Protest and the 
Environment 
The foregoing discussion suggests a number of avenues for further 
exploration and illuminates several gaps in the dominant theory of 
environmental protection that has developed over the past fifty years. 
First, it is notable that the stories recounted here appear to follow two 
distinct paths. One is that of the law—the broad form deed, the 
development of SMRCA, litigation surrounding mountaintop mining, 
and litigation around the MVP and ACP. But the other is that of the 
individuals who live, work, and play in the very environment at stake—
 
135. Id. 
136. See Brittany Patterson, As Pipeline Construction Booms, Citizens Take 
Inspections into Their Own Hands, W. Va. Pub. Broadcasting (Aug. 
29, 2019), https://www.wvpublic.org/post/pipeline-construction-booms-
citizens-take-inspections-their-own-hands#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/ 
 LAZ3-YUMG]; About Mountain Valley Watch, Mountain Valley 
Watch, https://www.newrivergeographics.com/mvw/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 K6MN-UY8P] (“Mountain Valley Watch is a collaboration of volunteers 
and experts who observe, document, and report environmental issues 
related to the construction of the Mountain Valley Pipeline between Wetzel 
County, West Virginia, and Pittsylvania County, Virginia.”) (last visited 
June 23, 2020); December 2019 Report to the Virginia Water Control Board, 
Mountain Valley Watch, https://www.newrivergeographics.com/mvw/ 
 december-2019-report-to-the-virginia-water-control-board/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 38JF-7DXE] (last visited June 23, 2020). 
137. See sources cited supra note 40. 
138. See supra Part I.  
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protestors who risk their safety and liberty and who dedicate their time 
to fighting energy projects that are fundamentally allowable under the 
legal system. Each path influences the other, but the legal literature 
has lagged in theorizing and incorporating a role for protest in 
environmental law. 
This critique resonates heavily with the environmental-justice 
literature, and efforts should be made to more fully account for protest 
as it relates to environmental justice and influences environmental law. 
Moreover, the civil-society literature insists on its role in constitutional 
ordering, but it should more earnestly roll up its sleeves to engage 
protest as an aspect of civil society. Other literatures are relevant, too, 
including procedural justice, administrative law, and the conundrum of 
NIMBY-ism in environmental law.139 
Finally, I observe that these insights need both theorization and 
operationalization. At its fifty-year anniversary, the EPA has in place 
several tools that hold promise, if fully deployed, for promoting 
environmental justice and better incorporating local knowledge into 
decision-making.140 But these basic principles lag much further behind 
at other agencies charged with environmental protection—and the fact 
remains that environmental law does not fully offer protection. As the 
climate imperative looms ever more heavily, the need to engage, learn 
from, and follow the lead of those directly impacted becomes all the 
more acute. It is not overstatement to remark that the next fifty years 
depend on it. 
 
139. See, e.g., Ori Sharon, Fields of Dreams: An Economic Democracy Framework 
for Addressing NIMBYism, 49 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,264, 10,267–70 (2019) 
(connecting NIMBY and environmental justice, and collecting sources). 
140. See EPA, supra note 2. 
